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 LYING ABOUT FIRM PERFORMANCE: 
 EVIDENCE FROM A FIRM SURVEY IN NIGERIA 
 
 ABSTRACT 
It is difficult to be sure that managers in developing countries report financial information 
accurately and truthfully during firm surveys.  The most common concern is that managers might 
under-report performance to avoid attracting attention from the tax authorities or corrupt 
bureaucrats.  Using a method developed in the literature on corruption, this paper identifies 
managers who appear to be reticent or deceptive and compares their answers with the answers of 
non-reticent managers.  The paper shows that reticent managers report that their firms are more, 
not less, productive than non-reticent managers.  The paper then assesses possible reasons for 
this, finding that the most likely explanation is that reticent managers exaggerate performance so 
that they or their firms look good.  Because past studies have found that reticent managers appear 
to lie about other aspects of firm and manager behavior—including underreporting corruption—
this suggests that it will be difficult to fully assess how these behaviors affect firm performance 
unless reticence is controlled for. 
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I. Introduction 
Managers are sensitive about firm performance (Iarossi, 2006).  This sensitivity might 
encourage them to either refuse to answer questions about firm performance or to lie when they 
do.  The most common concern is that managers under-report firm performance  (de Mel and 
others, 2009).  If they are concerned that their firm could be identified, they might lie because 
they are concerned about tax liability or about becoming a target for corrupt officials.   
This is not however the only reason why managers might lie.  Past studies have found 
that some firm managers lie to interviewers so that they or their firms look good (Azfar and 
Murrell, 2009; Clausen and others, 2010). It therefore seems plausible that they might do the 
same when reporting firm performance.  That is, they might over-report, rather than under-
report,  performance so that they look like better managers. 
The results in this paper show that this appears to the case—managers identified as 
reticent or deceptive, using a technique developed in the literature on corruption (Azfar and 
Murrell, 2009), appear to over-report firm performance relative to non-reticent managers.  To the 
extent that reticence differs across regions within a country or across countries, this could make 
cross-region and cross-country comparisons of firm performance difficult.   
Previous studies have also found that reticent managers appear deceitful in other ways.  
They appear to underreport corruption (Azfar and Murrell, 2009; Clausen and others, 2010; 
Jensen and Rahman, 2011), over-report how honest they are (Azfar and Murrell, 2009) and over-
report that they are ISO certified (Clausen and others, 2010).  Because they over-report 
productivity, reticence could introduce a spurious correlation between firm performance and 
these and any other behaviors that reticent managers lie about.   
The paper extends the literature on reticence in several ways.  First, it focuses on a 
different issue than past studies, which mostly have focused on how firm managers answer 
questions about corruption (Azfar and Murrell, 2009; Clausen and others, 2010; Jensen and 
Rahman, 2011).   
Second, the focus on firm productivity allows us to look at possible reasons for the 
different responses of reticent and non-reticent managers.  We able to indirectly assess whether 
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differences between firms with reticent and non-reticent managers are due to reticent managers 
exaggerating or firms with reticent managers outperforming other firms.  We do this by 
comparing responses of reticent and non-reticent managers who report productivity data from 
their firm’s written records and those that report them without reference to written records.  As 
discussed below, it is easier for reticent managers to exaggerate when financial data are not taken 
directly from the firm’s written records.  If the difference is attributable to  reticent managers 
exaggerating, we would therefore expect to find larger differences between reticent and non-
reticent managers when the manager does not refer to establishment records.  If it is attributable 
to firms with reticent managers outperforming other firms, we would expect to see firms with 
reticent managers outperforming other firms irrespective of the source of the information. 
Third, it proposes an instrument for reticence, based on the identity of the enumerator.  
This reduces concern about measurement error and reverse causation. This is useful because the 
approach used to identify reticent respondents, which is based on coin tossing, will randomly 
misidentify some respondents as reticent.  It will also help to control for reverse causation—the 
possibility that firm performance affects reticence rather than reticence affecting managers’ 
responses about firm performance. 
II. Discussion and Hypotheses 
When interviewers ask managers sensitive questions on topics such as corruption, some 
manager refuse to answer (Jensen and others, 2010).  Even when they do answer, some might lie.  
Recent studies have tried to assess how important lying is for the measurement of corruption.  
Using randomized questions to identify reticent managers, Azfar and Murrell (2009) estimate 
that the prevalence of corruption in Romania would be at least a third higher if reticent 
respondents answered truthfully.  Clausen and others (2010) and Jensen and Rahman (2011) find 
similar results in Nigeria and Bangladesh.   
Questions about corruption are not, however, the only sensitive questions in most firm 
surveys.  Firm managers often do not like answer questions on things such as taxes, profits, and 
commercial activities (Iarossi, 2006).  Given the sensitivity of these questions it seems plausible 
that reticent respondents might also lie in response to these questions.  This is especially likely to 
be the case when data on firm performance does not come from the firm’s accounts.   
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Although neither paper focuses on whether reticence is associated with reported firm 
performance, Clausen and others (2010) and Jensen and Rahman (2011) find evidence consistent 
with the idea that it might be.  Clausen and others (2010) find that firms with reticent managers 
are more likely to claim to be ISO certified than other firms and Jensen and Rahman (2011) find 
that firms with reticent managers are more likely to report that they had invested in fixed assets.   
There are several possible reasons why reticent managers might report better 
performance than other managers.  One possibility is that firms with reticent managers might 
outperform other firms.  That is, the positive correlation between reticence and firm performance 
might be because reticent managers have other attributes (e.g., caution, links to the authorities) 
that make them better managers.  A second possibility, suggested by Jensen and Rahman (2011), 
is that managers of high-performing firms might become reticent.  For example, if being 
successful makes managers targets for corrupt bureaucrats, they might become less willing to 
discuss corruption or illegal behavior with interviewers.  A third possibility, suggested by 
Clausen and others (2010), is that reticent managers might exaggerate performance to make 
themselves or their firms look good.  This would be consistent with results in Azfar and Murrell 
(2010) that suggest that reticent managers are more likely to say corruption, lying and other 
sensitive behaviors are never justified.  That is, reticent managers might be trying to make their 
firms and themselves look better than they really are. 
This paper looks at a simple measure of firm performance – value added per worker (i.e., 
labor productivity) – to see whether firms with reticent managers report better performance than 
other firms. We use this measure because it is relatively simple and does not rely on the firm 
keeping detailed accounts.  As discussed below, few firms report data from their company 
accounts and even few keep audited accounts. 
Hypothesis 1:  Previous studies that have looked at different measures of firm and 
manager performance, have found that firms with reticent managers report better 
performance than other firms.  We therefore expect that firms with reticent 
managers will report higher labor productivity than firms with less reticent 
managers.   
If reticent managers answer questions on labor productivity differently than other firm 
managers, it would be useful to understand why this is.  To see whether performance differences 
between firms with reticent and non-reticent managers are real, we compare responses from 
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firms whose managers reported performance data from firm accounts or establishment records 
with firms whose managers reported numbers without consulting establishment records.  As 
discussed below, only about one-quarter of managers in the survey used in this study reported 
performance data directly from company accounts or records. 
It is easier for managers to misreport performance information when they do not report 
data directly from establishment records.  If we find that firms with reticent managers that 
present data without consulting establishment records appear to outperform similar firms but that 
firms with reticent managers that present data from establishment records have similar levels of 
performance to similar firms this would suggest that reticent managers over-report their firms’ 
performance.  That is, if firms with reticent managers were outperforming other firms and the 
managers were reporting information truthfully, we would expect to see similar differences 
irrespective of the source of the data.   If this were the case, this would suggest that either 
reticence affects performance or that high performance encourages reticent.  If, in contrast, we 
found that firms with reticent managers only out-perform firms with non-reticent managers when 
they do not report performance data from establishment records, this suggests that reticent 
managers overstate performance when they can do so easily. 
Although it is harder for firms that report numbers directly from their books to lie to 
interviewers, it is not impossible.  For example, firms might keep two sets of company accounts 
(e.g., one for management and one for the tax authorities that understate performance or one for 
management and one for outside investors that overstate performance).  The first of these seems 
more likely because almost all firms (92%) have a single owner—meaning that most have no 
outside investors to lie to.  But even in this case, it is still just as easy for firms that report data 
without referring to their accounts to lie to the interviewers as it is for managers that report their 
firms’ performance directly from establishment records.  If we found that firms with reticent 
managers outperform irrespective of where the data comes from, it would be difficult to 
conclusively argue that any difference is due to firms with reticent managers outperforming other 
firms rather than that both types are lying.   
Hypothesis 2:  We expect that firms with reticent managers will only appear to 
outperform firms with less reticent managers when the manager reports 
performance data without consulting any establishment records.  This would be 
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consistent with the idea that reticent managers overstate their firms’ performance 
rather than the alternative hypothesis that these firms actually outperform firms 
with less reticent managers. 
Reticence is measured based on a procedure, described below, where recipients toss a 
coin before answering a question.  By construction, some non-reticent respondents (i.e., those 
who toss heads many times) will be classified as reticent.  Because of this, it is useful to use 
2SLS to reduce concern about measurement error (Goldberger, 1964).  
This will also reduce concern about reverse causation.  It is possible that firm 
performance might affect reticence rather than reticence affecting reported firm performance.  
For example, managers of high performing firms might become reticent if they are worried that 
being candid might encourage corrupt bureaucrats to seek bribes.  Alternatively, managers of 
poorly performing firms might be concerned that their firms’ poor performance reflects poorly 
on them and therefore might be more likely to exaggerate performance and to be reticent in other 
ways. In the first case, this would exaggerate performance differences between reticent and non-
reticent firms.  In the second case, it would have the reverse effect. 
To see whether this is the case, it would be useful to have an instrument for observed 
reticence that was unrelated to firm performance.  Although Azfar and Murrell (2009) and 
Clausen and others (2010) discuss the characteristics of firms with reticent managers, many 
things that affect reticence (e.g., manager education) might also affect firm performance.   
One plausible thing that might affect reticence is the quality of the interaction between 
the manager and the interviewer.  How cooperative the manager is during the interview is 
affected by how well he interacts with the interviewer.  Iarossi (2006, p. 157), for example, notes 
“respondents are more willing to comply with requests from people who are similar to them, 
people who praise them, people who are familiar to them, and people with whom they like to be 
associated.”  Although this will depend on characteristics of the manager, it is also likely to 
depend on characteristics of the interviewer.   
Although we don’t have any socio-demographic information on the interviewers, it is 
possible to identify all of the firms that each interviewer interviewed.  It is, therefore, possible to 
construct interviewer-level measures of reticence (i.e., the average level of reticence of all 
managers interviewed by the same interviewer).  For the most part, we might expect successful 
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interviewers to have characteristics that appeal to most, or many, managers.  If this is the case, 
we would expect interviewers that were more successful at getting truthful responses from other 
managers to be more successful when they interview the next manager.   
To test whether this is the case, we construct a variable indicating the average reticence 
of other managers interviewed by the same interviewer.  When we construct this for each 
manager, we omit the managers’ own responses (i.e., it is a ‘leave-one-out’ average).  If some 
interviewers are more successful than others, we would expect this variable to be positively 
correlated with the manager’s own reticence.   
Hypothesis 3:  We expect that reticence depends on characteristics of the 
manager and firms involved and on characteristics of the interviewer.  We expect 
that a manager will be more likely to be reticent if the interviewer has a high 
number of  reticent respondents among his or her other interviewees.   
If the leave-one-out average is correlated with the manager’s reticence, it seems plausible 
that this might be a useful instrument.  Because the managers’ responses are omitted from the 
leave-one-out average, it should depend on characteristics of the interviewer but not the manager 
him or herself. 
III. Data 
The data used in this paper comes from the 2007 and 2009 Enterprise Surveys for 
Nigeria, which were conducted by the World Bank.  The surveys covered all manufacturing 
sectors (group D based upon ISIC 3.1), construction (group F), retail and wholesale services 
(sub-groups 52 and 51 of group G), hotels and restaurants (group H), transport, storage, and 
communications (group I), and computer and related activities (sub-group 72 of group K).
1
  
However, since the data needed to calculate labor productivity were only collected for 
manufacturing firms, firms from other sectors have been excluded. These surveys are used 
because they are the only Enterprise Surveys that include reticence data. 
 Performance Data 
Not all performance data comes from company accounts.  Many firms in Nigeria, 
especially small firms, do not keep detailed financial accounts meaning that figures must be 
                                                 
1
 See Iarossi (2009) and Iarossi and Clarke (2011) for details on the 2007 and 2009 surveys respectively. 
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estimated. In other cases, the firm might have records but might not want to show them to the 
interviewer or the records might not be readily available at the time of the interview.  
At the end of the survey, the enumerator reported whether the employment and 
productivity data were taken directly from establishment records; were estimates computed with 
some precision; or were arbitrary and unreliable numbers.  Since the enumerators reported that 
the numbers were arbitrary and unreliable in only a tiny number of cases (2 out of 2620), the 
sample can be divided into those firms where the data came from establishment records and 
those where it does not.  About 639 of the 2,618 firms in the sample reported results from 
establishment records.  This is not atypical.  Of over 60,000 firms in over 100 countries 
interviewed between 2006 and 2010 in the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey program, only about 
35 percent of managers reported financial and employment information directly from their 
establishment’s records. 
 Identifying reticent respondents 
We identify reticent respondents—respondents that are reluctant or unwilling to answer 
questions—using the methodology developed by Azfar and Murrell (2009) and used by Clausen 
and others (2010) and Jensen and Rahman (2011).
2
  They identify reticent respondents by 
looking at responses to a series of ‘random response’ questions (see Table 1).  The respondent is 
asked a sensitive question (e.g., related to tax evasion, misuse of power within the firm) and is 
asked to toss a coin out of sight of the interviewer.  If the coin comes up heads, the respondent 
answers ‘yes’.  If it comes up tails, the respondent answers the question.   
Random response procedures were developed to encourage truthful responses to sensitive 
questions.
3
 The idea is that if the respondent answers ‘yes’ no one other than the respondent, not 
even the interviewer, will ever know whether the respondent is saying that they committed the 
sensitive act or just that the coin just showed heads.  It was expected that this approach would 
decrease underreporting of sensitive behaviors. 
                                                 
2
 The description relies heavily on the descriptions in Azfar and Murrell (2009) and Clausen and others (2010).  See 
those papers for more detail.  The data used in this paper is the same as the data used in Clausen and others (2010).   
3
 See Fox and Tracy (1986) for a general discussion or Recanatini and others (2000) for a discussion that is directly 
linked to the Enterprise Surveys. 
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Although randomized questions appears to reduce underreporting, it remains a serious 
problem.
4
  That is, even when the respondent knows that the interviewer will not know whether 
the respondent is answering ‘yes’ because the coin showed heads or because the respondent has 
done the activity, respondents still underreport sensitive behavior.  Azfar and Murrell (2009) 
note that with randomized responses at least 50 percent of respondents should answer ‘yes’ to the 
sensitive questions.  That is, even if no one has committed the sensitive act, the coin should show 
heads for half of the respondents.  If some people have committed the act, more than 50 percent 
of people should answer ‘yes’.  Azfar and Murrell (2009) and Clausen and others (2010), 
however, find an implausible number of ‘no’ answers. They argue that some people whose coin 
comes up ‘heads’ must be answering ‘no’ anyway.   
Table 2 shows the expected distribution of ‘yes’ responses if no one had done any of the 
sensitive behaviors, the expected distribution if 30 percent of respondents had actually done each 
sensitive behavior, and the observed distribution of ‘yes’ answers across the two surveys.  Even 
if no one had done any of the sensitive behaviors (i.e., no one had ever cheated on their taxes), 
there are too many people with zero and one yeses (15 percent and 9 percent compared with 
expected amounts of 1 percent and 6  percent) and too few people with 5 or 6 yeses (13 percent 
and 3 percent compared with expected amounts of 16 percent and 6  percent).   
The ‘angel’s’ assumption, however, is probably not reasonable.  For example, on an 
indirect question elsewhere on the survey, close to 75 percent of managers said that they thought 
a ‘typical firm in their sector’ underreported their sales to the tax authorities.  Given this high 
estimate—and the possibility that this understates the true extent of tax evasion because of 
concern about self-incrimination even with indirect questions—it seems implausible that no 
firms had “ever paid less in business taxes than [they] should have under the law.”  Since this is 
one of the questions used to assess reticence, the angel’s assumption seems unlikely to be valid.   
If we assume that 30 percent of people have actually done each sensitive behavior, the 
distribution is even more skewed.  That is, there are less people who responded ‘yes’ four, five, 
six or seven times and more people who responded ‘yes’ zero, one, two or three times than 
                                                 
4
 Lensvelt-Mulders and others (2005) suggests that it reduces underreporting from about 45 percent to 38 percent.   
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would be expected.  This would become even more skewed if we assumed a greater incidence of 
sensitive behaviors. 
In this respect, reticence does not appear to be an all-or-nothing behavior.  Because of 
this, we will use a measure of reticence that allows for ‘more’ and ‘less’ reticence rather than an 
all or nothing measure that assumes the person is reticent if they respond ‘yes’ zero times and 
otherwise as non-reticent as in Azfar and Murrell (2009).  The measure we use is the number of 
no responses, with more no responses (or fewer yes responses) indicating greater reticence.  In 
the robustness checks, we show results using the same dummy variable as in Azfar and Murrell 
(2009). 
IV. Econometric Analysis 
This section looks at whether firms with reticent managers report that they are more 
productive than other firms.  We also try to assess possible reasons for this.  First, we try to 
assess whether this is because firms with reticent managers actually outperform firms with less 
reticent managers.  Second, we try to control for measurement error and endogeneity. 
 Econometric Methodology 
We estimate the following equation to see whether the evidence is consistent with the 
idea that reticence affects reported performance:  
  
The dependent variable is labor productivity (value-added per worker).  Given that most 
firms do not report performance data from audited accounts (see Table 3) and that only a single 
year of data are available, it seems appropriate to focus on this simple measure.   
The main variable of interest is the measure of reticence.  For the main part of the 
analysis, we use the number of no answers to the seven sensitive questions.  Firms that have a 
greater number of ‘no’ answers (fewer ‘yes’ answers) are more reticent.  As noted above, this is 
slightly different from the measures used in earlier papers.  As a robustness check, we also 
present the main results for the dummy variable proposed in Azfar and Murrell (2009). 
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The reticence variable is interacted in some specifications with a dummy variable 
indicating whether the manager reported financial information from the firm’s written records.  
As noted above, we would expect misreporting to be easier when the information does not come 
from written records.  If we found that reticent managers only report better performance when 
they do not report information from written records, this might suggest that they are exaggerating 
(see Hypothesis 2 above) 
The control variables include other firm characteristics that might affect firm 
performance.  The variables are similar to those used in Clausen and others (2010).  The 
variables include a set of dummy variables indicating the age, gender and educational attainment 
of the manager.  Previous studies using enterprise level data for Sub-Saharan Africa have found 
that firms are better performing when the manager is better educated  (Biggs and others, 1998).  
Similarly, firms with older managers would be expected to perform better to the extent that 
manager age is a reasonable proxy for experience.  They also include a variable representing the 
size of the firm and a full set of sub-sector dummies.
5
  The sub-sector dummies are included 
because labor productivity differs across sub-sectors within manufacturing.  Finally, as in 
Clausen and others (2010), we include dummies indicating that the firm was interviewed in 2009 
rather than 2007 to allow for changes over time and a regional dummy indicating that the firm is 
in the South. 
As discussed above, measurement error is a concern.  Firm managers that randomly toss 
long sequences of heads will be mislabeled as reticent.  Because OLS coefficients are biased 
towards zero when independent variables are mismeasured, 2SLS coefficients might be 
preferred. 
A 2SLS analysis also potentially controls for reverse causation.  Although reticent 
managers might report higher productivity because they are reticent, it is also possible that 
performance affects reticence.  For example, managers of firms that are performing well might 
                                                 
5
 Clausen and others (2010) used slightly different controls variables for firm size and sector—three dummies 
indicating size and broad sector of operation (e.g., retail, manufacturing, and other services).  As noted there are 
large differences in labor productivity across sub-sectors of manufacturing (e.g., garments and chemicals), so 
including additional dummies seems useful. 
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be more wary about reporting illegal or unethical behavior because they are concerned that the 
tax authorities will target them. 
The instrument we use is the average number of ‘no’ responses from the other firms 
interviewed by the same interviewer.  If, as discussed above (see hypothesis 3), some 
interviewers are better at getting truthful answers than other interviewers, this leave-one-out 
average might be correlated with the likelihood that the manager is reticence.  The results are 
consistent with this.  In the first stage regression, the coefficient on average reticence is positive 
and statistically significant (F-stat=231.8, p-value=0.00).  Moreover, the ‘leave one out’ average 
does not include the manager’s own responses and therefore should capture characteristics of the 
interviewer rather than the manager.   
 Econometric results 
Value-added per worker.  In the base regression, the coefficient on the variable 
indicating  reticence is positive and statistically significant at a 10 percent significance level  (see 
Column 1 in Table 4).  This suggests, consistent with hypothesis 1, that firms with reticent 
managers report that they are more productive than other managers do.  The point estimate 
suggests that reported labor productivity is about 1.6 percent higher for firms that respond ‘no’ to 
an additional question.   
The positive coefficient could suggest that firms with reticent managers are more 
productive than firms with non-reticent managers.  However, it is also possible that reticent 
managers might exaggerate their firms’ performance.  To look at this more carefully, we interact 
the variable indicating reticence with a dummy variable indicating that the accounting 
information came from establishment records.  If reticent managers exaggerate performance by 
giving enumerators inaccurate numbers, we would expect this effect to be less when the manager 
reports numbers from establishment records (see hypothesis 2).  
For managers that reported numbers from establishment records, the coefficient on the 
dummy indicating the manager is reticent is statistically insignificant and small.  This suggests 
that when the numbers are taken from establishment records, there appears to be little difference 
in reported performance between firms with more and less reticent managers.   
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In contrast, the coefficient on the dummy variable is statistically significant and positive 
when the manager estimated the numbers without consulting establishment records.  The point 
estimate suggests that reported labor productivity is about 2.3 percent higher for firms that 
respond ‘no’ to an additional question.  These results are consistent with the idea that reticent 
managers overstate performance when their data does not come from establishment records.  
That is, firms with reticent managers only appear to be more productive when the manager 
estimates the productivity numbers rather than reports them from establishment records. 
As discussed above, measurement error is a concern because reticence is likely to be 
poorly measured.  That is, some people will get long sequences of heads and these people will be 
falsely identified as reticent.  Because OLS coefficients tend to biased towards zero when the 
dependent variable is poorly measured, 2SLS might be preferable. In addition to controlling for 
measurement error, this approach might also lessen concerns about reverse causation.   
The coefficient on the variable indicating reticence remains positive and is statistically 
significant at a 1 percent level (see column 3) in the 2SLS regressions.  The coefficient from the 
2SLS regression is, however, much larger.  This would be consistent with the idea that 
measurement error is biasing the OLS coefficient downwards or that managers of poorly 
performing firms are more reticent.  The point estimate suggests that reported labor productivity 
is about 20 percent higher for firms that respond ‘no’ to an additional question.  As before, the 
effect is only positive and statistically significant when the manager did not get employment and 
performance data from the firms’ written records (see column 4).   
 Robustness Checks: Audited accounts 
Not all firms that reported employment and performance data from establishment records 
reported information from detailed and audited company accounts.  It seems plausible that firms 
that rely on informal records might report less reliable data than firms that have detailed audited 
accounts.  We therefore divide the sample into three groups: firms that did not report data 
directly from establishment records, firms that reported data from establishment records but that 
do not have audited accounts, and firms that reported data from establishment records and have 
audited accounts.  We interact the reticence dummies with dummy variables indicating which 
group the firm is in. 
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The coefficient on the interaction term remains positive and statistically significant for 
firms that did not rely on establishment records (see Table 5).  In contrast, it is small and 
statistically insignificant for the other two groups.  This suggests that there is no difference 
between firms with reticent and non reticent managers that relied on establishment records 
irrespective of whether they have audited accounts or not. 
 Robustness Checks: Alternate measure of reticence 
Previous papers, including Azfar and Murrell (2009), use a different measure of reticence 
than the measure used in this paper.  Rather than using the number of no responses, which allows 
for more and less reticence, they use a simple dummy variable indicating that the respondent said 
‘no’ in response to all questions.  To check the robustness of the main results, we re-run the 
2SLS regressions using the measure that they use in their analysis. 
The coefficient on the dummy variable remains positive and statistically significant for 
firms that do not rely on establishment records.  That is, reticent firm managers report higher 
labor productivity when they do not report their employment and performance data from 
establishment accounts.  The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating reticence remains 
statistically insignificant for firm managers that report employment and performance data from 
establishment records.   
V. Conclusions 
Reticent managers report that their firms are more productive than other managers.  This 
is consistent with results in Clausen and others (2010) and Jensen and Rahman (2011) that 
suggests that reticent managers report better performance in other ways (ISO certification and 
investment).   
To assess why this is, the paper exploits that while some managers report performance 
data directly from establishment records, others do not.  Because it is harder to exaggerate when 
the data come from establishment records, if reticent managers are exaggerating we would 
expect greater performance differences between firms with reticent and non-reticent managers 
when the data do not come directly from establishment records.  The results are consistent with 
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this.  There is a significant difference between firms with reticent managers and other firms only 
when performance data does not come from written records. 
To reduce concern about measurement error and reverse causation, we also present 
results from a 2SLS analysis.  The instrument is the average count of ‘no’ responses of other 
managers interviewed by the same interviewer (that is, a ‘leave-one-out’ average).  If some 
interviewers are better at gaining the confidence of reticent managers, responses might be 
affected by the interviewer.  Consistent with this, the instrument is a good predictor of whether a 
manager is reticent or not.    The results from the 2SLS analysis suggests that reticence affects 
reported firm performance more strongly than the OLS results do.  This is consistent with either 
measurement error biasing the coefficient toward zero or poor performance increasing reticence. 
Reticent managers appear to exaggerate, not underreport, firm performance relative to 
other managers.  If managers routinely under-report firm performance in firm surveys because 
they are concerned about becoming targets for tax inspectors or corrupt bureaucrats (de Mel and 
others, 2009), reticent managers might actually report more reliable information than non-
reticent managers. 
The results also support a different interpretation for previous results that show that 
reticent managers under-report corruption.  If the main reason that reticent managers lie to 
survey takers is that they are worried that the tax authorities or corrupt bureaucrats might use the 
survey to identify and target successful firms, we would expect them to under-report 
performance.  That they exaggerate suggests that they have a different motive.  That is, they 
appear to be boastful—they answer questions so that they and their firms look good.  If their 
reason for underreporting corruption is similar, this suggests that they might not lie about 
corruption because they are concerned about any repercussions associated with doing so.  Rather 
they might not want admit to corrupt acts because they are concerned about how it would reflect 
on them or their firms.   
These results have several implications for survey design.  First, at least in cases where 
productivity data do not come directly from establishment records, it is important to collect 
information on reticence.  Measures of reticence will serve as useful control in regressions for 
firm performance, corruption and other sensitive behaviors.  Second, it is useful to provide 
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researchers ways to identify the specific interviewers involved in each interview (that is, 
interviewer numbers).  Reticence appears to depend, at least in part, on the identity of the 
interviewer and so this information is useful as a control and potentially to construct instruments.   
The results suggest that mangers only over-report firm performance when they do not 
report them directly from establishment records—something that is true for close to two thirds of 
firms in the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys.  This suggests that putting more emphasis on 
getting data from written accounts would be useful.   
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VII. Tables 
Table 1: Sensitive questions used to identify reticent respondents 
Question Random response questions 
1 Have you ever paid less in personal taxes than you should have under the law? 
2 Have you ever paid less in business taxes than you should have under the law? 
3 Have you ever made a misstatement on a job application? 
 Have you ever used the office telephone for personal businesses? 
4 Have you ever inappropriately promoted an employee for personal reasons? 
5 Have you ever deliberately not given your suppliers or clients what was due to them? 
 Have you ever lied in your self-interest? 
6 Have you ever inappropriately hired a staff member for personal reasons? 
 Have you ever been purposely late for work? 
7 Have you ever unfairly dismissed an employee for personal reasons 
Source: Questionnaire for World Bank’s Enterprise Survey for Nigeria (2007 and 2009). 
Note:  The three bolded questions are less sensitive questions that were included to allow sophisticated reticent respondents to not have to give 
large numbers of ‘no’s’ consecutively if they realized that this would be very unlikely 
 
Table 2: Expected and actual distribution of 'yes' responses 
Number of Yeses 
Expected  if all are 
angels 
Expected % if 30% have 
done each behavior 
Actual % of respondents 
in survey 
0 0.8% 0.1% 15.2% 
1 5.5% 0.8% 9.9% 
2 16.4% 4.7% 13.6% 
3 27.3% 14.4% 22.2% 
4 27.3% 26.8% 21.8% 
5 16.4% 29.8% 12.8% 
6 5.5% 18.5% 3.4% 
7 0.8% 4.9% 1.2% 
Source: Author’s calculation based upon data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey for Nigeria (2007 and 2009). 
Note:  Counts are unweighted.  The ‘angels’ assumption assumes that no one has done any sensitive behavior.  The ‘30% assumption’ assumes 30 
percent of respondents actually have done each sensitive behavior. 
 
Table 3:  Accounts and Establishment Records 
 
Figures from 
establishment records 
Are estimates computed with 
precision 
Total 
Does not have audited accounts 497 1,729 2,226 
Has audited accounts 142 250 392 
Total 639 1,979 2,618 
Source: Author’s calculation based upon data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey for Nigeria (2007 and 2009). 
Note:  Counts are unweighted 
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Table 4: Base Regressions controlling for reticent 
Dependent Variable Labor productivity (value-added per worker) 
Estimation Technique OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Observations 2123 2121 2115 2113 
Sector Dummies Included 
Reticence 
       Number of no responses 0.016* 
 
0.183*** 
    [high numbers mean more likely to be reticent] (1.84) 
 
(6.21) 
    Number of no responses --data not from establishment 
records 
 
0.023** 
 
0.218*** 
   [high numbers mean more likely to be reticent] 
 
(2.43) 
 
(6.63) 
   Number of no responses --data from establishment 
records 
 
-0.021 
 
0.046 
   [high numbers mean more likely to be reticent] 
 
(-1.20) 
 
(0.88) 
Firm Size 
       Number of workers 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 
   [Natural log] (6.10) (5.80) (5.44) (5.17) 
Manager age and gender a 
       Manager is male -0.058 -0.065 -0.043 -0.034 
   [Dummy] (-1.18) (-1.32) (-0.81) (-0.64) 
   Manager is 30 or younger -0.167*** -0.169*** -0.144*** -0.142*** 
   [Dummy] (-3.53) (-3.60) (-2.82) (-2.76) 
   Manager is between 31 and 45 -0.182*** -0.190*** -0.137*** -0.142*** 
   [Dummy] (-5.26) (-5.48) (-3.60) (-3.68) 
   Manager is over 56 0.116** 0.121** 0.114* 0.120* 
   [Dummy] (2.05) (2.14) (1.87) (1.95) 
Manager education b 
       Manager has secondary education 0.152*** 0.164*** 0.127*** 0.139*** 
   [Dummy] (4.02) (4.32) (3.09) (3.36) 
   Manager has tertiary education 0.380*** 0.385*** 0.351*** 0.359*** 
   [Dummy] (7.65) (7.77) (6.52) (6.62) 
Other Controls 
       Interview in Wave 2 0.235*** 0.231*** 0.188*** 0.181*** 
   [Dummy] (7.14) (7.02) (5.14) (4.91) 
   Southern state -0.011 -0.004 -0.100*** -0.084** 
   [Dummy] (-0.35) (-0.15) (-2.79) (-2.32) 
   Firm presented data from establishment records 
 
0.297*** 
 
0.780*** 
   [Dummy] 
 
(3.24) 
 
(3.19) 
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.04 0.03 
Source: Author’s calculation based upon data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey for Nigeria (2007 and 2009) 
a Omitted age category is 46-55.  b Omitted education category is primary ***, **, * Statistically Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
Note:  T-statistics in parentheses.  Sector dummies are included for: garment manufacturers; textile manufacturers; food and beverage manufacturers; chemical and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers; construction material manufacturers; furniture and wood manufacturers; metal and metal product manufacturers; paper, printing and 
publishing manufacturers; plastic manufacturers; electric equipment manufacturers; motor vehicle manufacturers; other manufacturing; retail and wholesale trade; 
hotels and restaurants; construction; transportation; and other services.  Outliers more than three standard deviations from mean values are dropped. 
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Table 5: Additional Regressions controlling for reticence 
Column (1) (3) 
Estimation Technique 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent Variable Labor productivity Labor productivity 
Observations 2112 2113 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes 
Reticence 
  
   Number of no responses --not from establishment records 0.218*** 
 
   [high numbers mean more likely to be reticent] (6.65) 
 
   Number of no responses --from establishment audited records 0.041 
 
   [high numbers mean more likely to be reticent] (0.70) 
 
   Number of no responses --from establishment unaudited records 0.048 
 
   [high numbers mean more likely to be reticent] (0.92) 
 
   Firm answered 'no' to all question -- not from establishment records 
 
1.593*** 
   [Dummy equal to 1 for reticent firms]  
 
(6.31) 
   Firm answered 'no' to all question -- from establishment records 
 
-0.042 
   [Dummy equal to 1 for reticent firms]  
 
(-0.20) 
Firm Size 
  
   Number of workers 0.096*** 0.117*** 
   [Natural log] (4.24) (5.00) 
Manager age and gender a 
  
   Manager is male -0.040 -0.023 
   [Dummy] (-0.74) (-0.40) 
   Manager is 30 or younger -0.131** -0.111** 
   [Dummy] (-2.54) (-1.97) 
   Manager is between 31 and 45 -0.136*** -0.154*** 
   [Dummy] (-3.50) (-3.71) 
   Manager is over 56 0.120* 0.094 
   [Dummy] (1.95) (1.40) 
Manager education b 
  
   Manager has secondary education 0.135*** 0.125*** 
   [Dummy] (3.24) (2.77) 
   Manager has tertiary education 0.340*** 0.362*** 
   [Dummy] (6.19) (6.18) 
Other Controls 
  
   Interview in Wave 2 0.186*** 0.104** 
   [Dummy] (5.04) (2.31) 
   Southern state -0.086** -0.098** 
   [Dummy] (-2.37) (-2.48) 
   Firm presented data from establishment records 0.776*** 0.310*** 
   [Dummy] (3.19) (5.35) 
   Firm has audited accounts 0.139** 
 
   [Dummy] (2.26) 
 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 
Source: Author’s calculation based upon data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey for Nigeria (2007 and 2009) 
a Omitted age category is 46-55.  b Omitted education category is primary.   ***, **, * Statistically Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
Note:  T-statistics in parentheses.  See Table 4 for additional notes. 
 
